In a highly-promoted two part series last week titled “Myth-busting claims in Alaska’s oil tax debate,” the Alaska Dispatch identified what they “consider the most duplicitous oil-tax myths being perpetrated surrounding the oil-tax debate raging in Juneau.”  Part 1 of the Dispatch piece is published here; part 2 is here.

The series doesn’t attempt to address “myths” existing on both sides of the debate – and there are.  Unabashedly, the Dispatch focuses only on what the authors identify as those “myths that have arisen, one way or the other, from the oil industry and their allies.”  So much for balanced reporting.

Later in the week, Andrew Halcro took on the Dispatch’s alleged myths one-by-one in his blog in a piece titled, “C’mon.”  Interestingly, while the Dispatch has run other of Halcro’s pieces on its pages, to date it has not published this rebuttal.  For those interested in balance, Halcro’s piece is a good beginning.

For my part as I worked through their sources and the math, I have realized that the Dispatch’s “myth busters” have created more than a few myths of their own in writing the article.  The result is, instead of bringing clarity to the the oil tax debate among Alaskans, the Dispatch has only made the debate even more murky and myth-ridden.

Four of the Dispatch’s so-called “myths” stand out in particular – “Myth No. 2:  Alaska oil companies are taxed 80 to 90 percent,” “Myth No. 3:  North Dakota is so much rosier than Alaska,” “Myth No. 5:  The pipeline is running dry,” and “Myth No. 6:  Alaska is running out of oil.”  We bust each in turn.

Busting Myth No. 2:  It turns out the Alaska oil companies ARE taxed 80 to 90 percent

The Dispatch piece claims “Alaska’s tax rate is not 80-90 percent. … [A]t $100 a barrel, Alaska taxes the oil industry about 40 percent.”

Interestingly, even the source data that the Dispatch offers to justify its claim shows that the tax rate is much higher.  In a public exchange following the publication of the articles, the Dispatch forwarded me a chart which one of the authors said supports its numbers.  (The writer said, “I took the numbers directly from the Alaska’s tax analyst at DOR.  Nearly word-for-word.  And I asked her three times. That’s not my spin on them. They also have prepared a chart, which I’ll email to you and which they presented to the Legislature.”)  The chart follows:

(For a larger version, click on the slide.)

The first thing that should strike the reader about the chart is that the Dispatch’s alleged state tax rate of “about 40%” or anything near it doesn’t appear at the $100/barrel level which is the purported focus of the Dispatch’s analysis.  Instead, the chart shows that the Alaska’s portion of the profit share (shown in green) at $100/barrel is “53%.”  Much more importantly, in order to arrive at the Dispatch’s percentage figure, the writers ignore the effect of federal taxes on the producer’s profit share.  Thus, in reaching to “bust” what it views as an industry myth about tax levels, the Dispatch creates a gigantic myth of their own – that only state tax levels matter to producers.

The Dispatch appears to derive its number (“about 40%”) by taking the percent of state take stated on the chart at $100/barrel (53%), times the profit level on which the chart is based ($74), and then applying the resulting number ($39) as a percentage of the gross revenue on which the chart is based ($100).  But that is a serious distortion of how profit based taxes universally are stated (Norway’s for example, is stated as 78% of the producer’s profit).  It also is a distortion of how the number has been used in Alaska.  Changing the methodology in order to create a point – comparing a number calculated based on gross revenues to numbers based on after-expense profits – does not “bust” a myth; it creates one.

At the end of the day, the point is simply that the very chart on which the Dispatch claims to rely demonstrates that, in fact, “Alaska oil companies are taxed 80 to 90 percent.”  The Dispatch is the one creating the myth.

Busting Myth No. 3:  It turns out that North Dakota IS much rosier than Alaska

The Dispatch piece claims “… here’s what you really need to know:  The total state take — including taxes and royalties — in North Dakota is about 33 percent. The total state take in Alaska, is about 39 percent. That’s a 6 percent difference, nowhere near a ‘double and triple the rate in North Dakota.’”

Again, the Dispatch focuses only on state take levels, but let’s accept that for the moment.

In North Dakota, the Dispatch reports that the “state’s severance take is 11.5 percent, equaling $11.50 a barrel on a $100 barrel of oil.  The state’s corporate income tax ads another dollar or so to that, and then there’s another small sales tax.  All told, North Dakota’s take is roughly $13 on a barrel of oil.”  Converting that to numbers comparable to those on the chart above, that $13 amounts to a tax of 17.6% stated on a “profit” basis (for those doing the math, 17.6% is the percentage resulting from dividing the level of tax [$13] by the level of profit [$74]).

In the article, the Dispatch takes Arctic Slope Regional Corp. Senior Vice President Tara Sweeney to task for asserting that “the ACES tax rate … imposed double and triple the rates of … North Dakota.”  (The full Sweeney quote relied on by the Dispatch is here at page 13.)  Well, that turns out to be true using the Dispatch’s own numbers.  The 53% Alaska tax rate contained on the chart is, in fact, “double and triple” the 17.6% state tax rate in North Dakota.

The Dispatch claims that such a comparison is unfair, and that a reader needs to add to the North Dakota number an additional amount for royalty.  It is not clear why that is the case – in North Dakota, royalty goes to private land owners, not the state, and so seems largely irrelevant in calculating the effect of government actions on the industry.  Moreover, the Dispatch claims that in comparing the state’s two royalty regimes, the reader needs to use a higher, 20% royalty rate for North Dakota (which is the marginal rate negotiated for new leases, but is much higher than the rates contained in the older leases which cover the larger part of the production), compared with the 12.5% rate for Alaska which is the level used in the calculations underlying the chart discussed above.  But, again, let’s accept those assumptions for the moment.

Even adding the 20% royalty rate to the North Dakota calculation only produces an overall combined “take” rate in North Dakota of 43.6% compared with Alaska’s 53%.  Adding in federal income taxes – which contrary to the Dispatch’s assertion would be higher on North Dakota production because of North Dakota’s lower overall level of state take, but let’s assume for this purpose they are even – results in an overall take rate of 74% for North Dakota compared with 84% for Alaska.

Even that 10% — or over $7/barrel – gap understates the difference in take levels between the two states, however.  Let’s assume for the moment an oil price of $120/barrel, rather than the $100/barrel level used by the Dispatch.  In that event, the state take on Alaska production (again, using the chart) rises to 59% and the level of overall government take to 86%.  In North Dakota, however, the state “take,” even including royalty at 20%, declines to 40.5% of profits and the overall level of  ”take,” using the same federal income tax number, to 71%.  Thus, in a rising oil price environment, the gap between Alaska and North Dakota expands even further, something the Dispatch fails to mention.

And, what if you compare apples to apples and use the royalty rate which applies to most of North Dakota’s production, the same as the Dispatch does for Alaska?  The gap between Alaska and North Dakota grows to 19% (or $14) at $100/barrel, and 23% (or $22) at $120/barrel.

The net result?  Well, it turns out that North Dakota is rosier than Alaska.  As for the use of the term “much rosier,” that appears to be in the eye of the beholder.  Even assuming only the $10 difference in profit/barrel that exists at $100/barrel oil and compares apples to oranges on royalty levels, that difference adds up to nearly $1.3 billion annually at 600,000 barrels per day.  Comparing apples to apples at $100/barrel results in a difference of over $2.6 billion annually.  That certainly satisfies the definition of “much rosier” in my book – and more importantly, in investors’ – if not the Dispatch’s.

Busting Myth Nos. 5 and 6: It turns out that the state’s (financial) pipeline IS running dry

The Dispatch’s Myths Nos. 5 and 6 are actually the same thing, stated differently.  Myth No. 5 is “The pipeline is running dry;” Myth No. 6 is “Alaska is running out of oil.”  In both cases, the Dispatch purports to be busting the “myth” that Alaska is running out of oil, in the case of Myth No. 5, through the pipeline, and in the case of Myth No. 6, on the North Slope.

Actually, in my experience the producers always have been very open and bullish on Alaska’s remaining potential.  In 2006 testimony before both the House and Senate, for example, BP testified clearly that more known oil and gas resources remain on state lands on the North Slope than have been produced since the beginning of production from Prudhoe Bay.  The “myth” that the resource potential is other than substantial, if it exists, has been self-induced.

To be fair, I agree with the Dispatch that some myths have grown up around the date that the pipeline might shut down for mechanical reasons.

Focusing on those two arguments, however, badly miss the greater point.  The greater point is that the State’s financial pipeline – which is tied to the oil production rate, not reserve life – is running dry.  To suggest that Alaskans do not need to be concerned about the current state of the industry because of the potential of the North Slope resource or because the life of TAPS may stretch out longer, creates a much more dangerous myth than any the Dispatch otherwise seeks to dispel.

Two charts from the most recent 10-year forecast by the State’s Office of Management and Budget tell the story.

The first assumes that the rate of state spending is held below recent levels, but that oil prices continue to increase at the robust levels forecast in the Governor’s most recent budget.

That scenario is about as close to a “best case” as you can get.  The chart nevertheless shows that continued production declines send the state into the red by 2016 and keep it there from then on.  (Spending levels are shown by bars; revenue levels are shown by a line.)

The second chart lowers spending even further, but bases oil revenues on $90/barrel oil.

Under that scenario, continued oil production declines push the state into the red beginning next year and keep it in that position thereafter.

In short, regardless of the level of overall resource potential or the potential life of TAPS, if the production rate does not stabilize – and soon – Alaska is facing a very difficult future.  Or, as I put it to the Senate Resources Committee in recent testimony, the effect of a longer life for TAPS may mean that the “person that turns the lights off on Alaska’s economy can stay a few more years, but the remainder will have left long before.”

In short, by focusing only on the potential resource base and the life of TAPS, the Dispatch masks the much more important point.  What is mythical is that Alaska is doing fine.   Alaska may not be running out of oil potential and, due to the ability to accommodate low flows, the pipeline may have a longer life than some have argued, but due to increasingly lower production rates Alaska’s financial pipeline is running very low.

Busting two more “Myths” that the Dispatch added along the way

In the course of their series, the Dispatch has created two other “myths” that matter.  The first is the claim that Alaska’s producers have an obligation to invest and develop in Alaska, even if there are other locations in the world that provide better economic returns.  The second is the implication arising from the Dispatch’s first myth, that the State of Alaska is a reliable business partner.  We bust each of these in turn.

The producers have an obligation to develop in Alaska in preference to other locations that produce better economic returns

In the course of responding to comments following the publication of the second article in the “Myth busting” series, co-author Amanda Coyne made this statement:

… at some point, and to some people who understand the law, comparing Alaska to Angola to North Dakota, et al, should [become a] pointless exercise. The leases read that if there’s a reasonable expectation of profit, they [the producers] have a duty to produce. It doesn’t matter how much more money they can make elsewhere.

Interestingly, that theme adopts virtually verbatim a recent line of argument that Senator Bill Wielechowski – and only Senator Wielechowski – has been suggesting.

The statement it is just flat out wrong.  As I explained in a commentary on these pages responding to Senator Wielechowski that predated the Dispatch series, the leases that cover most of the existing fields on the North Slope — including Prudhoe and Kuparuk, the largest two — simply do not include the term “reasonable expectation of profit” or indeed, even the word “profit.”  Instead, the leases provide only as follows:  “This lease contemplates the reasonable development of said land for oil and gas as the facts may justify.  Upon discovery of oil or gas in paying quantities on said land, Lessee shall drill such wells as a reasonably prudent operator would drill having due regard for the interests of the Lessor as well as the interests of the Lessee.”

For those that truly “understand the law,” the term “reasonably prudent operator” is a facts and circumstances test that fully takes into account other opportunities a producer may have.  In short, a “reasonably prudent operator” is not expected to forego alternatives offering higher economic returns in order to pursue others that offer lower, or more uncertain, returns.

To her credit, Ms. Coyne posted a second comment following my note to her pointing out the error.  The note reads “Let me make a correction/clarification on my comment above.  Only the new leases have the profit clause.  The old ones, which include most of the North Slope leases, read like this [quoting the reasonably prudent operator language].  Sorry all.  This just came to my attention.”

In making the “correction/clarification,” however, Ms. Coyne left her first post as well, leaving to the reader to figure out how to reconcile the two and leaving the “pointless exercise” language untouched.

In fact, the two statements cannot be reconciled; the first is just wrong and by leaving it, the Dispatch has repeated and publicized yet another myth.

The State of Alaska is a reliable business partner

In the published series, the Dispatch’s first myth was that the “Oil companies are always trustworthy business partners.”  Frankly, whether someone – or some company – is “trustworthy” is in the eye of the beholder.  If the Dispatch thinks that the producers are not reliable, so be it.  But if the Dispatch’s standard of reliability applies, the converse proposition implied by the Dispatch – that the State of Alaska is a reliable business partner – is similarly mythical.

At the core of the relationship between Alaska and the producers is a contract.  Like any contract, the agreement between Alaska and the producers – termed an “oil & gas lease” – sets forth the terms that are intended to govern their relationship.  Most of the leases that cover the relationship between Alaska and the North Slope producers were entered into in the late 1960’s and early 1970’s.

The fundamental economic trade they reflect is simple.  Alaska leased the covered lands to the producers for the development and extraction of any oil and gas that the producers found on it.  In exchange, the producers agreed to (1) pay the State of Alaska an upfront cash bonus regardless of whether they found any oil or gas on the lands, (2) pay for all of the investments made to develop the lands and (3) pay over to the State of Alaska, either in kind or in cash, one-eighth (12.5%) of all the oil and gas that the producers found and produced from the lands.  In order to permit the producers’ to realize the benefit of the investments they make, the parties explicitly agreed that the contract would continue as long as oil and gas is produced in paying quantities.

While otherwise somewhat unique in the world, the bonus and royalty approach to the development of oil and gas is common in the U.S.  In cases in other states, courts sometimes have referred to the “fair share” doctrine when addressing oil and gas issues.  The doctrine usually comes into play when determining what each owner’s share of production should be.  When disputes arise between the owner of the lands and its lessee, courts commonly refer to the lease terms as establishing the “fair share” between the two parties — in other words, the courts enforce the contract.

For over three decades, Alaska respected its side of the bargain.  While the state imposed a production tax in addition to receiving its royalty share of production, the level of and method used in calculating the production tax roughly stayed in line with that used in other states as a means of funding the oil producer (and lessor’s) share of the costs of state government.

That balance changed dramatically in 2006 and 2007, however.  Under the banner of obtaining Alaska’s “clear and equitable share,” Alaska legislatively increased its “fair share” from that agreed in the contracts, plus a customary and common level of production tax, to something much, much greater.  Importantly, the state did so unilaterally, without even attempting to renegotiate the revised terms with the producers to maintain the overall balance contemplated by the contracts.  One alternative, for example, would have been for the state to take a larger share of the results of production in exchange for making some of the investments.

Frankly, as an oil and gas lawyer with then nearly 30, and now nearly 35, years’ experience, I thought then and continue to think now that the state’s actions in 2006 and 2007 breached the terms of its contracts with the producers.  In a number of respects, Alaska’s actions in 2006 and 2007 – unilaterally increasing the level of the state’s “fair share” – closely resemble those of other governments which have attempted in their own ways legislatively to override the terms of previously negotiated contracts.  The result in those situations often has been that those governments have found themselves on the receiving end of an expropriation suit.

Regardless of whether Alaska’s actions rise to the full level of breach, however, they certainly meet the Dispatch’s standard of unreliability.  The State said – in this case, agreed — in its leases to one level of “fair share,” and subsequently has done another.  The failure of the Dispatch equally to call balls and strikes on both sides of the relationship is disappointing – and myth making – in its own right.

From Dermot Cole’s blog today, “Legislators about to pass bill to limit access to campaign finance reports,” Fairbanks Daily News-Miner, Feb. 15, 2012.:

Our legislators are racing to make it more difficult for the public to follow the money at election time.   In the last two weeks, a bill to ease the electronic reporting requirements of candidates with the Alaska Public Offices Commission has been introduced and moved to the verge of final passage in both houses. …

There are onerous tasks associated with running for state office, but electronic filing with the APOC is not one of them. …  Legislators should reverse course on this bill.  They should focus instead on working with the APOC …. 

As someone who has (attempted to) follow campaign finance reports in the past, I agree with Dermot.  The current law, which requires electronic filing for the first time this year, creates transparency and openness — good things.  This proposed change goes in the wrong direction.

For APOC’s views on the bill, see Casey Kelly, “APOC Blasts Bill Changing Campaign Disclosure Rules,” KTOO Juneau, Feb. 14, 2012.

The appearance before Senate Resources last Thursday was interesting.   The slide deck for my testimony is here.   As I said to the Committee, the “August 9″ date on the cover is likely because it was snowing (again) the day I did the slide and my subconscious was wishing for another season.  The actual date, of course, was February 9.

The video of the hearing is here.  My appearance begins at 35:35.  There were several questions and comments by members of the Committee.  The most extensive comments came from Senator Stedman.  Part of my presentation contained a series of slides and discussion around recent forecasts made by the Office of Management of Budget (“OMB”).  The forecasts come from the most recent OMB 10-year plan and  compare the level of state expenditures against revenues over the ten year period beginning with Fiscal Year 2012.

Due to declining oil production, the OMB report clearly shows and my testimony reflects that Alaska government starts running a deficit (expenses exceed revenues) sometime this coming decade under all of the scenarios addressed in the plan.  Under OMB’s most probable scenario, the deficits start in FY 2016 — a little over three years from now — and continue to deepen through the remainder of the decade.   But that scenario assumes the continuation of very robust oil prices, ranging from an average of roughly $109/bbl in FY 2012 to $120/bbl in FY 2022.

If instead oil averages $90/bbl over the same period, the OMB plans shows that the state starts running deficits beginning this coming year (FY 2013).   Even more troubling is what the OMB plans show happens to the state’s financial reserves in the event that scenario comes to pass.   Over time, the state has created two budget reserves that are intended to operate as savings accounts — rainy day funds — to be tapped when oil revenues fall below expenditure levels.  Under OMB’s most probable scenario, one of the reserves (the Statutory Budget Reserve or “SBR”) is completely drained and the other (the Constitutional Budget Reserve or “CBR”) is starting to be tapped by the end of the 10-year period.

In the $90/bbl scenario, the SBR is drained by FY2016 and so is the CBR by FY 2021.  As a result, in the $90/bbl scenario, the OMB numbers show that both of the state’s rainy day funds have been fully depleted by the end of the 10-year period.

The point of including these data in my presentation simply was to demonstrate that the decline in oil investment — and thus, production rate — is a here and now problem.  The purpose was to provide a counterpoint — an “alternate perspective” — to earlier suggestions that Judge Gleason’s recent finding regarding the potential life of TAPS should “ease the mind” of Alaskans and justify ”keeping oil taxes where they are.”

Staring at the potential for looming deficits resulting directly from continued declines in production, my point was that Alaskans  and their Legislature should be concerned — now — about the effect of declining level of oil production, and that the Legislature should focus — now — on finding ways to stem that production decline.

Senator Stedman was curiously defensive on the point.  During the course of questioning, Senator Stedman said that the scenarios developed in the OMB report are not “going to happen … we [the Legislature] won’t let that happen.” (Senator Stedman’s comments on this point begin at 71:30 of the vide0.)  In the same vein, at the end of the presentation he added further that “some of the presentation on the finances should be taken with a grain of salt.”  (85:15 of the video).  Along the way, he also threw in a “ridiculous.”

The fact that the Senator dismisses the use of the OMB reports so blithely is troubling.  These aren’t industry or trade group data — these are projections that Alaska’s own state government is providing.  The reports should set off serious alarm bells about Alaska’s future.  To suggest that Alaskans dismiss the warnings simply on faith that the Legislature “won’t let that [future] happen”  places too much faith — and power — in the Legislature.

After all, Alaska has gotten itself into this situation in the first place partly through the acts of the Legislature — most particularly, the passage of ACES in 2007.

More importantly, the remedy Senator Stedman suggested during his questioning that the Legislature is likely to adopt to avoid the future painted in the OMB reports  is similarly troubling.  In the course of discussing why OMB’s forecasts “won’t happen,” the only remedy he suggested was to cut expenditures.

If this is the direction the Legislature chooses to go, the OMB forecasts imply huge cuts.  Under the most likely scenario, the cuts required by FY 2022 would be over a quarter of otherwise projected state expenditures.  Under the $90/bbl scenario, the cuts required would start next year at more than 10% of expenditures and grow to more than half of projected state expenditures by FY 2022.

The purpose of my testimony was to suggest another way — to focus on stabilizing and increasing production levels to help address the situation on the revenue side.  Managing the decline through expenditure cuts — which will need to be dramatic based on the OMB forecasts  – should not be the preferred option.

Frankly, I have come away from the experience concerned about the Legislature’s focus on Alaska’s largest looming problem.  The OMB forecasts are a clear sign that Alaska’s economy faces serious, near term challenges.  The warnings should be taken seriously, not with “a grain of salt.”

It may be true, as Senator Stedman suggests, that the future won’t fulfill the projections.  But that misses the ultimate point — what will happen between now and then to change that future?

Will it be, as Senator Stedman suggests, because the Legislature cut expenditures to keep the budget balanced.  Or will it be because Alaska found ways to increase production rates.  One way or another, the future is upon us.

____________________________________

Addendum:  My testimony was the subject of an entry on the same day in Dermot Cole’s (Fairbanks Daily News-Miner) blog,   ”‘It’s the production rate, stupid’ Anchorage oil attorney argues.”  Additional mentions are in articles on the larger set of Senate Resources hearings by Matt Buxton, “Senate concludes pipeline lawsuit review,” Fairbanks Daily News-Miner, Feb. 9, 2012; Pat Forgey, “Parnell’s view of oil tax policy challenged,” Juneau Empire, Feb. 10, 2012; and Lisa Demer, “Oil tax debate cuts to core of state-industry relationship,” Anchorage Daily News, Feb. 13, 2012.

My appearance yesterday on the Dan Fagan Show — the television version — is available here.  The segment runs from 1:54:30 to 2:27:10. Dan followed up for a few minutes after beginning at 2:29:30. The discussion started with the recent TAPS decision by Judge Gleason, and went on from there.  We continued the exchange this morning on Dan’s new radio show on KOAN – and ended up having an extended discussion of the Norway business model.  I don’t find a recorded segment available online of the radio discussion, but it was an interesting exchange that I look forward to continuing.

In the meantime, HCR 19, “Acknowledging the lessons learned from the 2011 Norway Policy Tour and encouraging investment in the state’s oil and gas industry,” introduced by Rep. Bob Herron and co-sponsored by Reps. Edgmon, Seaton, Tuck, Guttenberg, Gardner, passed the House Economic Development, Trade and Tourism Committee this week and has been referred to House Rules for consideration before being advanced to the floor for a vote.

Among other things, the Resolution calls on the Legislature to “explore how co-investment in resource extraction activities would benefit private sector job expansion, affordable energy options, value-added options, revenue generation and competitiveness.”  That’s a start.

While catching up on reading over the weekend I came across an article in the Calgary Herald that made my hands go cold.  The headline was “Shell sees oil lows of $70 in 2012 volatility.”

The story reported on Shell’s recent 2012 outlook and quoted Shell Chief Executive Peter Voser as saying, in preparing the outlook, that Shell had used “a $50-$90 range for oil.”

Then, discussing the $50-$90 planning range, “Simon Henry, Shell’s chief financial officer, told analysts: ‘I’m not sure we see it right at the bottom of that one over the next 12 months, but we could certainly see it in the middle of that range.’”

What is the impact on Alaska if Shell’s outlook is correct, and oil ends up “in the middle” of a $50 – $90/barrel price range on the year?  Very, very bad things.

Why?  Simple.  Alaska’s oil production has declined to the point that the state is entirely dependent on high prices to maintain current levels of state spending.  A quick read of the Executive Summary of the State of Alaska Office of Management and Budget FY 2013 10-Year Plan makes the point.

“Scenario 3″ (at p. 13-14) of the Executive Summary describes the present and future that forms the baseline for the Governor’s proposed FY 2013 budget.  In that world, oil averages $108.98/bbl in FY2012, $109.47/bbl in FY 2013, $109.08/bbl in FY  2014 and so on up to $120.31 in FY 2022.  Even under that scenario, Alaska begins running a budget deficit — which it covers by starting to draw down the Statutory Budget Reserve — beginning in FY 2016.

What happens if oil falls below those levels?  ”Scenario 2″ (at p. 11-12) outlines the picture at $90/bbl oil.  It is not a pretty one.  Deficits start with a bang next year — the deficit in FY 2013 alone is $ 650 million — and widen to roughly $4.4 billion by 2022, the end of the forecast period.  Under that scenario, the Statutory and Constitutional Budget Reserves are exhausted by FY 2020.  The only safety net beyond that is the Permanent Fund, which if used in that capacity, will itself be consumed sometime in the 2020′s.

So, what happens if oil falls to the $70/bbl level projected by Shell?  There isn’t a scenario in the OMB plan that covers that prospect, but if one extrapolates by doubling the impact of going from roughly $110/bbl (“Scenario 3″) to $90/bbl (“Scenario 2″), the results are disastrous.   Deficits begin this year instead of next, the SBR and CBR are used up by FY 2017 instead of FY 2020 and the Permanent Fund, if tapped to make up the difference, disappears by the mid- 2020′s.

My guess?  Your hands are going cold as well.

‎2.5.2012 Perkins Coie’s Daily Alaska Oil & Gas Newsletter,  http://ow.ly/8TIzE (permalink). Today’s lead, “Oil taxes highlight busy week for lawmakers;” “Shell hopeful for Arctic drilling.” For more news, see the “Daily Articles & News” column (lower right side) at http://bgkeithley.com/. Daily headlines and links from Upstream Online, Oil & Gas Journal, Petroleum Economist, Platt’s, LNG World News, Fuel Fix, plus

An article posted this week in Natural Gas Asia  goes a long way toward explaining why any Alaska LNG project is challenged.

In a brief story headlined “Kogas, Cheniere Sign LNG Deal,” Natural Gas Asia reports that “South Korea’s Kogas and Cheniere Energy have signed a 20 year deal in which [Cheniere] will supply LNG from [its] Sabine Pass export plant in Louisiana.  Kogas has agreed to purchase approximately 3.5 million tonnes per annum of LNG [roughly 500 MMcf/d] upon the commencement of train three operations. Deliveries are expected to occur as early as 2017. “

Why is it economic to export US Gulf Coast LNG to Korea?   A large part of the reason  is the projected 2014 completion of the $5.25 Billion Panama Canal expansion project. With the expansion, today’s modern LNG tankers will be able to use the Canal route to reach the Pacific Rim, significantly cutting transit costs, times and inefficiency which currently impeded the reach of such supplies (for a good discussion of that topic see “Panama opens Asia to US LNG exports,” Petroleum Economist (Nov. 2, 2011)).

What does that have to do with Alaska LNG?  By efficiently linking substantially lower priced L48 US gas supplies with the (currently) higher priced Pacific Rim markets, the Panama Canal expansion is anticipated to have a significant (downward) impact on Pacific Rim LNG prices.  Indeed, according to the Petroleum Economist analysis, the completion of the Panama Canal expansion project is expected to lower transit costs to the point that US Gulf Coast LNG poses a direct competitive threat even to already commenced Australian LNG projects, not to mention the much more distant (in time) Alaska LNG project.

The irony?  Having already undermined the economics of the proposed L48 Alaska gas pipeline, the L48 US shale gas revolution now appears well on its way  to undermining Alaska’s expansion also into the Pacific Rim LNG market.

The take away?  Alaska needs to concentrate even more on coming to grips with the current level of oil investment.  The “gas cavalry,” which some continue to hypothesize will yet save Alaska’s economy, is unlikely to be riding over the hill anytime soon.

‎1.29.2012 Perkins Coie’s Daily Alaska Oil & Gas Newsletter,   http://ow.ly/8L8yw (permalink). Today’s lead, “Alaska faces tough choices amid oil decline.” For more news, see the “Daily Articles & News” column (lower right side) at http://bgkeithley.com/. Daily headlines and links from Upstream Online, Oil & Gas Journal, Petroleum Economist, Platt’s, LNG World News, Fuel Fix, plus.

In an interview published in this week’s Petroleum News (“Wielechowski remains critical of HB 110“), Senator Bill Wielechowski argues that, under their state oil & gas leases, producers are required to undertake additional drilling when they can make a “reasonable profit.”  (“I think you need to look at the legal obligation the companies incur when they take out a lease. Their obligations require them to develop the lease when they can make a reasonable profit.”).

This repeats an argument I first heard the Senator make repeatedly at a debate earlier this month with Senator Cathy Giessel and which he then repeated in a subsequent, extended exchange on Facebook following that debate.  (“The leases … say they must produce, drill, develop when they can make a reasonable profit.”)

The problem?  The leases which cover the vast majority of the existing North Slope fields don’t say what Senator Wielechowski says they do.

During the debate, the Senator referred to the following language:  ”Upon discovery of oil or gas on the leased area in quantities that would appear to a reasonable and prudent operator to be sufficient to recover ordinary costs of drilling, completing, and producing an additional well in the same geologic structure at another location with a reasonable profit to the operator, the lessee must drill those wells as a reasonable and prudent operator would drill, having due regard for the interest of the state as well as the interest of the lessee.”

That language, however, has only recently appeared in state oil & gas lease forms (see, e.g., Lease Form #DOG201112, the lease form used in this year’s North Slope oil & gas lease sale).

The older leases that cover most of the existing fields on the North Slope — including Prudhoe and Kuparuk, the largest two — include significantly different terms.  Indeed, those leases don’t include the word “profit” at all.  Instead, the closest provision to that relied on by Senator Wielechowski is in  paragraph 19, which provides only as follows: “This lease contemplates the reasonable development of said land for oil and gas as the facts may justify. Upon discovery of oil or gas in paying quantities on said land, Lessee shall drill such wells as a reasonably prudent operator would drill having due regard for the interests of the Lessor as well as the interests of the Lessee.”

Those that practice oil & gas law regularly know that the “reasonably prudent operator” standard establishes a far different obligation than the “reasonable profit” standard the Senator suggests.

During the Facebook exchange I pointed the issue out to the Senator.  (“The ‘reasonable prudent operator’ standard is a far cry from the ‘reasonable profit’ standard you suggested in your presentation and above. … I suggest that you may want to discuss your views with the officials actually in charge of administering [the leases] — none of whom, to my knowledge have raised the issues you suggest ….”)

The Senator’s response?  ”Thanks Brad. And Gary and others for the discussion. I’m running around today trying to get my car on the ferry to Juneau. Would love to continue the discussion another time either in Anchorage or Juneau.”    Then, over the weekend I read the Senator’s Petroleum News interview and noted that the Senator continued to misapply the new form language to the old leases.

In the interview — as in the earlier debate — Senator Wielechowski says that the state needs ”to act with our oil resources like any business, or any oil company, would.”  The first rule of any business is to be familiar with and comply with the actual terms of its contracts.  The Senator should start there.

In this week’s Petroleum News, Alan Bailey reports on the presentation on the Norway oil model last week before the Alaska World Affairs Council.  These pages previously have provided a copy of the slide deck accompanying the presentation.  Now, read Alan’s take on the discussion on the pages of the Petroleum News or here.

From the article:

Bradford Keithley, partner in the oil and gas practice of Perkins Coie LLP, attributed the decline in Alaska oil production to a parallel decline in Alaska oil investment.

“We’re shorting investment by roughly half of what we need to do in terms of getting production up,” he said.

Keithley said that, from his perspective, one of the biggest factors in encouraging oil industry investment in Norway is the Norwegian government’s own investment in the country’s oil and gas fields. Petoro, a company wholly owned by the Norwegian government, invests along with private industry as a working interest owner in every Norwegian field, with the government providing its share of development capital and subsequently earning its share of field profits. The extent of government financial participation in different fields varies, depending on the risks involved, but averages about 20 percent, Keithley said.

In Alaska, the government tries to drive the oil industry from the back seat through regulation, trying to push oil companies into doing what appears to be in the state’s interests, while sometimes pushing for actions that industry does not see as good investments, Keithley said. Under the Norwegian system, however, government and industry interests tend to be aligned, he said. …

The result [in Norway] is to generate more investment, both on the government side and on the side of private industry, Keithley said.

“It grows the pie, rather than what we do in Alaska, which is fight about what share everyone gets of the existing pie,” he said.

Read the remainder of the article on the pages of the Petroleum News or here.

Separately, there also will be presentations this coming week on the same subject before two legislative committees in Juneau.  House Economic Development, Trade & Tourism is holding a hearing Thursday at 10:15 am on HCR 19, “Acknowledging the lessons learned from the 2011 Norway Policy Tour and encouraging investment in the state’s oil and gas industry,” followed by a “Lunch & Learn” before House Resources at noon, Thursday, on ”Lessons Learned from Norway.”